Description
In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.
Author: Barry R. Posen
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Published: 01/13/2014
Pages: 296
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 0.96lbs
Size: 9.00h x 6.00w x 0.67d
ISBN13: 9780801478857
ISBN10: 0801478855
BISAC Categories:
- Technology & Engineering | Military Science
- Political Science | Security (National & International)
- History | Military | Nuclear Warfare
About the Author
Barry R. Posen is Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director of the MIT Security Studies Program. He is the author of The Sources of Military Doctrine, also from Cornell.