Minimum Deterrence and Indiaas Nuclear Security

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In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

Author: Rajesh M. Basrur
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 11/23/2005
Pages: 264
Binding Type: Paperback
Weight: 0.78lbs
Size: 8.90h x 6.42w x 0.61d
ISBN13: 9780804752565
ISBN10: 0804752567
BISAC Categories:
- Political Science | International Relations | Arms Control
- Political Science | Security (National & International)
- History | Military | Nuclear Warfare

About the Author
Rajesh M. Basrur is Director of the Centre for Global Studies in Mumbai, India. He has been a visiting fellow at Sandia National Laboratories, the Brookings Institution, and the Henry L. Stimson Center.

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