Description
This engrossing and meticulously researched volume reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944 defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, the Germans counterattacked. Received wisdom says that Eisenhower's Broad Front strategy caused his armies to stall in early September, and his subsequent failure to concentrate his forces brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German attack. Arguing to the contrary, John A. Adams demonstrates that Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF had a good campaign strategy, refined to reflect developments on the ground, which had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine.
Author: John A. Adams
Publisher: Indiana University Press
Published: 04/09/2010
Pages: 392
Binding Type: Hardcover
Weight: 1.55lbs
Size: 9.30h x 5.80w x 1.10d
ISBN13: 9780253354358
ISBN10: 0253354358
BISAC Categories:
- History | Wars & Conflicts | World War II | General
- History | Military | Strategy
About the Author
John A. Adams is author of If Mahan Ran the Great Pacific War (IUP, 2008).